History matters. Inspired by evolutionary approaches in economics and, more recently, economic geography, the authors present, through the lens of a slaughterhouse development on the city's fringe, a historical model of urban development in the metropolitan region of Calgary, Canada. Their analysis shows how an unanticipated system shock conditioned by strong historical differences in the political and economic aspirations of adjacent urban and rural jurisdictions manifested at multiple temporal and spatial scales. Their narrative explores the intertwined evolutionary trajectories of five key system elements whose pathways converged in 2004, resulting in unintended, and from a regional environmental perspective, undesirable, consequences.
We present a case study of a city that is better positioned than most to handle these challenges. Calgary, with a population of 1 million, has an unusually low level of fragmentation and is one of the foremost examples in North America of uni-city urban governance; 91.56% of the population in the metropolitan region are contained within the City of Calgary. Calgary is also the fastest-growing large city in Canada (a 12.4% increase between 2001 and 2006; see Table 1 ). With the highest per capita income among large Canadian cities, Calgary has resources for managing its problems that slow-growth or declining cities might not. Despite these advantages, political changes have resulted in these two characteristics increasingly coming into conflict. Calgary's ability to annex land to contain all new urban development and plan for its growth corridors decades in advance was curtailed after 1994. Neighboring rural municipalities have since promoted subdivisions and other urban uses without coordinating with Calgary's development plans, resulting in escalating regional tensions.
In May 2003, "crisis" responses by the Alberta provincial government to the emergence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) enflamed a long-standing dispute between rural and urban jurisdictions. Provincial programs to assist the beef industry included the promotion of new meat packing facilities to reduce reliance on live-animal exports. Conflict over the construction of a new beef processing facility in northeast Calgary reflects the historical forces structuring the city and its hinterland, with consequences that are still unfolding in unintended, unforeseen, and for some, undesirable ways. Political opposition within the city encouraged the promoters to move the project seven hundred meters to the neighboring Municipal District of Rocky View (MDRV). Urban/rural relations were tested when a deal between the City of Calgary and MDRV to extend existing infrastructure to the new facility could not be reached because the terms were seen by rural politicians as an attempt by the city to retain urban control over development in rural municipalities. Instead, to the dismay of urban politicians, MDRV set out to develop its own independent water and wastewater infrastructure.
Outcomes of social, political, economic, and environmental processes can be better understood by investigating the impact of decisions and events early in the system's history and relating how these have enabled or constrained subsequent actions. Cumulatively, these decisions and events lead to particular, locally contingent configurations of sociospatial relations that coevolve through a dialectical process with other elements of natural and urban systems. Past political and economic action become sedimentary layers of contemporary urban landscapes, political institutions, and social 618 Urban Affairs Review Table 1 Comparison of Canada structures. Although the past does not determine the future, it does make particular directions easier to pursue. This conditioning of human action is known as path dependence. Although the easiest course is not always followed, great effort is required to shift from the beaten path. Shaping new paths requires understanding the tendencies toward particular paths to "keep the path from kicking back in" (Torfing 1999; Garud and Karnøe 2001) . Our examination of how the historical geography of the Calgary region conditioned the course of the Rancher's Beef land-use dispute sheds light on these spatial sedimentations.
An Evolutionary Approach to Urban Change
The complexity of an urban region creates difficulties in explaining its transformative processes. As the context within which urban managers must navigate becomes larger in scale, less controllable, and less predictable, the relationship between the intentions of decision makers and the outcomes of their decisions becomes even less certain than it had been in the past. Unintended consequences seem more common than effective policy implementation. In this context, the application of ideas from the field of evolutionary economics seems attractive (Boschma and Frenken 2006; Martin and Sunley 2006; Plummer and Sheppard 2006) . Urban historians and other urban scholars have concentrated on urban transformation over time, for example, in the way that the location of past streetcar lines have continuing impact on urban forms after they have disappeared (Warner 1962) . There has, however, always been tension between seeing particular cases as unique and generalizations about the direction of change, ranging from the loss of community to the Chicago school of urban ecology to Marxian conflict analyses to postmodernist accounts. Evolutionary approaches offer perspectives that acknowledge the uniqueness and contingency of particular cases while generating insights that go beyond the idiosyncratic.
The basic insight in an evolutionary approach is that how and why institutions change over time are critical considerations in assessing the current state of affairs in a system and its potential. In other words, the evolutionary trajectory of the system plays a vital role in determining its future: history matters (David 1985) . Path dependence refers to the idea that events in a system's past are critical in determining its present and the range of options available for future evolution (Pierson 2000a) . Martin and Sunley (2006) define the key characteristic of path dependence as the inability of a system to shake free of its own history. Due to this, options chosen at crucial moments in the system's past have a disproportionate influence in shaping its future because they exclude other futures that might have ensued with alternative choices. A new set of critical issues, each with a range of alternatives, emerges unpredictably as the system evolves. As a recursive process, the consequences of these new choicessuch as the persistence of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard despite its supposed inferiority to other systems-constrain future options, and so on (David 1985; Greener 2002) . Martin and Sunley (2006, 400-1) identify three key features of path dependence. First, small, historically contingent "accidents" can have profound long-term effects on future pathways. Second, "early decisions reverberate through history, closing alternative paths and validating a particular path, with the implications that the outcomes need not be rational or optimal." In contrast to neoclassical economics, which is concerned with demonstrating how the economy "tends ineluctably towards a unique ex ante equilibrium state," there is "no inevitability of economic outcome or outcome that is independent of history or context" (Martin and Sunley 2006, 401) . Third, they focus on technological "lock-in," the idea that the reinforcing effects of complementarity and compatibility of technology, economies of scale, and the quasi irreversibility of investments (the inertia of sunk costs) create a situation that encourages reinvestment in existing pathways.
To date, evolutionary approaches have been integrated into economic geography more than in urban studies. While this might be because cities are much more complex than keyboards or even markets, this very complexity makes the approach fruitful. This study illustrates features of pathdependent systems by examining how intertwined evolution of distinct components of the sociospatial dialectic fuse to enable an apparently anomalous result. Path dependency helps explain the tendency of complex systems to produce unintended consequences that, in our study, frustrated the best efforts of urban managers and planners. A city is not simply on a single constrained path, but is a confluence of many distinct causal chains and beaten paths, resulting in interactions that are difficult to predict even if they can in hindsight be seen as following the paths of least resistance.
While the origin of evolutionary approaches in economics has resulted in most attention being paid to market processes, path dependence can be applied to any institution at any scale. In particular, we have had to pay greater attention to spatial aspects normally assumed away by economists operating theoretically on a frictionless plain. To contextualize our case study, we show how the original cartographic representation of the city seeded its subsequent layout and was a factor in the production of a spatiality of disamenities. The contemporary controversy over a new beef slaughterhouse demonstrates how the trajectory of operations in the beef industry, suddenly confronted with a system shock, left it ill equipped to weather turbulent changes to the status quo. Economic decisions taken early in the evolution of Calgary's urban form had unintended sociospatial outcomes that influenced public response to the slaughterhouse. Path dependence analysis arose from the attempt to explain implausible events, such as the persistence of the QWERTY keyboard. Our case study also seeks to explain an implausible outcome: how was it that an expensive infrastructure system, which duplicated an existing system and promoted what were, to many, unwanted forms of development, came to be built despite being the least efficient, most costly alternative among an array of potential options?
Background: From Mad Cows to Urban Sprawl
In the spring of 2006, MDRV, a rural municipality surrounding the city of Calgary, Alberta, on three sides, completed construction of a 42-km wastewater pipeline from Balzac to Langdon following a route deliberately skirting the city's northern and eastern perimeter ( Figure 1 ).
1 At CDN$40 million, the pipeline was seen by many as economically inefficient, as it duplicated existing capacity that could be provided at a small fraction of the cost. Moreover, to pay for the pipeline, MDRV would actively promote new development on the city's fringe, a plan, according to Calgary's mayor, that promoted environmentally unsound "rural sprawl" and unduly constrained the city's long-term planning capability and growth corridors.
The sequence of events leading to the construction of the pipeline was unknowingly sparked in May 2003, when BSE was discovered in an Alberta cow. The consequences of BSE were devastating to the Canadian beef industry, concentrated mainly in Alberta. Overnight borders worldwide closed to finished beef exports, and the most significant fraction of the industry, the shipment of live cattle to the United States, ceased. The resulting pileup of live cattle in Alberta feedlots provoked crisis responses by both industry and government, focusing principally on an apparent shortfall of domestic slaughter capacity (Fairbairn and Gustafson 2005, 3) . One such response was a proposal by Rancher's Beef Ltd. (RB), a syndicate of entrepreneurial ranchers and investors, to construct a slaughterhouse/packing operation in Calgary's northeast industrial zone (Figure 2 , inset). That spot was chosen mainly, according to RB, to be close to its most important labor market (comprising primarily foreign workers and recent immigrants) located in nearby residential neighborhoods. Despite abundant public sympathy and "patriotic" support (Smart et al. 2006) for the beef industry early in the BSE crisis, when RB officially announced its plans in March 2004, a vocal NIMBY movement, rooted in the politics of neighborhood community associations, quickly catalyzed. Due to the imminence of triennial municipal elections looming that October, the slaughterhouse issue endowed the protestors with greater political leverage than they might otherwise have had. Thus political considerations in an election year led RB to , under increasing pressure to get the project under way and with fears that because of political pressure Calgary City Council would deny its rezoning application, RB announced it was moving to MDRV at a site less than 1 km from the original proposed location inside Calgary city limits (Figure 2 ). This move stifled political opposition but produced other problems. No municipal utility infrastructure capable of servicing the packing plant yet existed. For MDRV, there were only two options: to make a deal with Calgary to extend city infrastructure or to build a system of its own. At one time, industrial development of this kind neither would nor could have been approved in MDRV without cooperation from the city. However, in 1995, changes to provincial legislation curbed Calgary's power to control regional urban development by transferring subdivision approval authority from the urban-oriented Regional Planning Commissions (RPC; abolished in the same legislation) to individual municipalities (Elder 1996) . Similarly, taxation revenue derived from local development, which under regional planning had flowed to cities (as the primary provider of regional urban infrastructure), was redirected to local government. In response, in an attempt to maintain some control over regional development and to protect its long-term growth corridors, the city instituted a policy of not extending urban infrastructure for urban uses to rural areas. In 1995, a period of low growth, this had not been as important an issue, but times had changed. In 2004, Calgary, as the administrative nexus of the Canadian oil industry, had been in an almost-decade-long economic boom driven by high world energy prices. The intense economic activity this generated fueled powerful forces in real estate markets, equating to soaring demand for residential, commercial, and industrial development. This activity has flooded across jurisdictional boundaries into adjacent land-rich, infrastructure poor, tax-hungry rural municipalities. But in 2004, rural municipalities were no longer bound by the dictates of regional planning, as they had been prior to 1995, and were free to develop when and where they chose. With an aggressive development agenda already on record (Municipal District of Rocky View No. 44 2004; McCormick and Hope 2006) , the timing of the BSE crisis was an unintended boon for MDRV because it provided a perfect reason to opt to build its own infrastructure (thereby locking in the preferred trajectory of ambitious development) instead of cooperating with Calgary. Now many lucrative residential and commercial "concept plans" already approved could be implemented. Adding to this good timing was that the provincial government, eager to be seen actively responding to the BSE crisis, became a de facto partner to MDRV in promoting the packing plant. Not only did the province contribute 20% of the pipeline's construction costs; it also furnished political support to MDRV in its battles with Calgary over regional development.
The discovery of BSE in May 2003 sparked an unlikely series of events that culminated with the construction of a beef packing plant, and a wastewater pipeline to service it, three years later; but BSE was not the cause. Instead, the chance timing of BSE with an oil-driven development boom, political dynamics in an election year, and the recent retooling of provincial legislation led to an expanded range of possible regional outcomes. Furthermore, the beef industry, dealing with a system shock for which it was unprepared and bound within a historical urban matrix it had significantly helped to shape (discussed below), provided MDRV an opening to further its aggressive development agenda when it relocated from the "city" to the "country."
Path Dependence
The right to control land development has been at the heart of rural/urban conflict in Alberta (Bettison et al. 1975 ). The RB case provides a lens to view the confluence of development processes with roots entangled throughout history. The case is set amid conflict between urban and rural municipalities over land development rights, over the control of water resources, over the location of noxious industrial facilities, and over the reaction of citizens (Lake 1993) .
There are five key elements that we consider as context:
Physical Geography
Ice, Wind, and Water
Ten thousand years ago, the Calgary area lay in the contact zone between two great glacial forces. The contact line between these two glacial fronts cut a north-south trajectory along the eastern front of the Rocky Mountains. As the climate warmed, vast rivers of melting water rushed southward along the contact zone, carving out a large channel. Today, part of that ancient watercourse is the site of the Calgary's primary north-south freeway: Deerfoot Trail. The Deerfoot vertically bisects the city into sections that have distinctive social-economic landscapes and dramatically contrasting environmental histories. Deerfoot Trail is both a physical barrier, separating the city into east and west, and an invisible curtain, segregating the city into distinct socioeconomic quadrants ( Figure 1 ). This brief sketch of Calgary's geologic past is intended to illustrate the way locally contingent circumstances can unpredictably condition the evolution of place-centered socioeconomic forces. This is not to say that some other equally contingent reality could not have emerged. Rather, the point is to give weight to the notion that path dependence is not only an economic or a political process (Pierson 2004; David 2007) but also an inherently spatial process (Boschma and Frenken 2006; Martin and Sunley 2006) .
A second contingent aspect of Calgary's physical geography relevant to this study is the city's proximity to the Rocky Mountains and, hence, to strong westerly winds that blow year round. In winter, these winds, called Chinooks, are much warmer than the local air mass, resulting in instances when air temperature can rise by 20°C or more inside one hour. These consistent westerlies played a central role in the spatial choices that were to set the initial path trajectories of Calgary's evolutionary spatial development in motion. A third contingent aspect of the local geography is water. Both ecologically and economically, access to and control over water resources had a significant impact on the spatial evolution of the metropolitan region. Particularly in light of a recently announced, permanent moratorium on new water allocations from local river systems, the political economy of water has emerged as a key factor that will influence future regional development. Once imagined as an abundant resource, city managers are now being confronted with water scarcity as the new reality.
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Embedding Path Dependence: Beef and Oil
The Beef Industry and City Form
As early as 1887, rancher-entrepreneurs operating around Calgary were struggling, similarly to our case, to create a vertically and horizontally integrated beef industry (Klassen 1999; Foran 2004) . A 1900 survey of Calgary's industrial base showed three packing plant operations, a soap works, a tannery, a pork packing plant, a cold storage works, and a brewery, illustrating Calgary's long relationship with the beef industry (Foran, Foran, and Balcers 1982, 106-7; Klassen 1999) .
Although the confluence of the Bow and Elbow rivers had always been a traditional meeting place of indigenous people, the location of the city was due to its selection by the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), in 1874, as a townsite and maintenance repair depot along the new national railroad. Despite pressure to locate the passenger train station in the part of Section 14 ( Figure 2 ) lying east of the Elbow River, where a ramshackle assortment of makeshift structures, owned mostly by land speculators and profiteers, already stood, the railway chose to locate its central passenger station on land it already owned in Section 15, three quarters of a mile to the west (Foran, Foran, and Balcers 1982, Figure 2 ). This initial decision had an important influence on the city's subsequent spatial configuration. For example, it dictated where future industrial development would be located, which in turn had a direct influence on the spatial evolution of the city's residential and commercial spaces.
With the train station and associated downtown business agglomerations located west of the Elbow, the finger of land between the two rivers became the CPR's primary industrial staging yards (Figure 2 ). Proximity to rail transport was a primary economic consideration in the location of stockyards. Since the CPR had a monopoly on the early stockyard operations (Foran 2004) , that area attracted the city's burgeoning stockyard and packing plant facilities (Klassen 1999; MacLachlan and Townshend 2003/2004 ). This also, unofficially, demarcated the original eastern boundary of the city. This was not so much because the Deerfoot corridor and the high ground to the east marked a logical and natural geographic constraint to urban development, although they did, but because the prevailing westerly winds resulted in a fetid downwind odor shed that made the zone to the east of the stockyards much more conducive to industrial than to residential development. In consequence, Calgary's industrial expansion for over a century has concentrated along the north-south extent of the Deerfoot that has expanded in concert with city growth. While the natural features of the landscape suggested a geographic logic for the city, it was the location, first of the railway and then of the stockyards, that set the trajectory governing the evolution of spatial patterns of industrial development.
During the early history of the city, commercial zones and middle-and upper-class residential districts were located west of the Elbow River, while industrial zones and the lower-and working-class residential districts were located to the east of the river. Cheap hotels near the stockyards sprang up with rooms to service tradesmen. Their ethnic and blue-collar character and the shenanigans associated with the east Calgary hotel trade combined to create a perception of eastern city spaces as both tough and dangerous. Moreover, the location of Calgary's "sporting houses" north of the Bow along Nose Creek enhanced east Calgary's bawdy reputation.
Cheaper land prices ensured that urban neighbourhoods inevitably did locate on land east of the stockyards. Protosettlements appeared as early as 1908, when land speculators, hoping to cash in on a development boom, tried to entice investors. By 1913, the market had collapsed, while the bulk of the property east of the Bow River remained unsold. The end of the boom, followed closely by World War I, stifled growth until the late 1920s. It was not until the 1930s that development would finally expand to this area. Growth would not recover fully until after World War II.
Forest Lawn, one of a number of hamlets to appear on the prairie east of Calgary during this period, incorporated as a village in 1934. By the 1950s, several small settlements coalesced to form the Town of Forest Lawn. The location of the town's major intersection less than 5 km east of the Calgary stockyards virtually guaranteed lower property values there. Yet despite a lack of infrastructure, which the town was too poor to provide, the preference for home ownership ensured continuing growth of blue-collar residential neighborhoods on Calgary's urban fringe (Bettison et al. 1975) . Meanwhile, the negative image of east Calgary, the cheaper land prices that resulted and the lack of a significant industrial tax base that could provide revenue to fund other urban services like sewer and water, had "locked in" the perception and the reality that Forest Lawn was destined to be a low-rent, low-regarded bedroom community. Ironically, it was precisely this style of low-quality, periurban developments, and the problems they created for the growth plans of Calgary and Edmonton, that had prompted the province to first convene the McNally Royal Commission in 1954 (discussed below).
After Forest Lawn was amalgamated with the City of Calgary in 1962 (following recommendations in the McNally Commission's final report), conditions improved. Although modern urban infrastructure was extended to Forest Lawn as part of the amalgamation agreement, this did not eliminate place-based social stigma associated with east Calgary, nor did it alter the historic sociospatial forces that had originally influenced the area's development and reinforced them with succeeding generations of spatially targeted industrial investment. In consequence, east Calgary has remained the preferred location for industrial growth as well as the primary destination for working class and, more recently, ethnic residential migration. These same forces earmarked east Calgary as the choice destination for the RB plant, which incited aggrieved reactions from local residents tired of the negative effects on property values resulting from industrial development.
The choice of location by RB resulted from a century of self-reinforcing economic feedback that structured the spatial configuration of the city. The primary reason RB chose to locate in the northeast was to be close to its workforce. The working-class ethnic workers it sought were found there because east Calgary housing prices were more affordable. Lower house prices, in turn, were the result of a lower-quality physical environment and a deeply engrained social stigma, which both had their genesis with the original choices by the CPR for their industrial activities and through specific government policies that inhibited the development of anything but working-class residential development (Foran 2008) . These economic choices were both enabled and bounded by the physical geography of the site, which led first to its choice as a settlement site and then later to the real and perceived inequities of the distribution of risks and amenities in the urban arena.
Boom and Bust in an Oil Economy
The oil industry has dictated the overall pace of investment and development in the Calgary region. The discovery of oil in 1947 transformed the economic, political, and social dynamics of Calgary and the province. Economic development in the region has been highly reliant on the vagaries of world energy markets. Boom or bust in the Alberta oil industry has similarly been the primary force in setting the pace of urban development and rural land conversion (Climenhaga 1997) .
Following 1947, there was a prolonged period of growth as the magnitude of the oil potential in Alberta became evident. This growth continued unabated until the 1970s oil shock catapulted the economy into a new period of even more intense growth. This spurt lasted until the 1980s, when new federal energy policy, followed by a precipitous drop in world energy prices, initiated a drastic turndown. The decline in oil-related activity resulted in a severe downturn in commercial and residential real estate markets.
After a tumultuous decline in oil prices in 1986, the provincial government was in dire political straits. The charismatic Alberta premier, Peter Lougheed, who was the local hero of the province's epic battle against the federal government over provincial autonomy and the National Energy Program earlier in the decade, had retired in 1985. His less compelling successor, Don Getty, was the premier when the crisis broke. After barely retaining power in the 1989 provincial election (considered a defeat in light of Alberta's history of massive government majorities), Getty was forced to resign. In 1992, Ralph Klein, the populist former mayor of Calgary, was elected party leader based on a neoliberal platform of fiscal austerity, conservative values, and a commitment for smaller government through devolution of power to lower levels of government and individuals and through the market.
One target for cost cutting was the system of regional planning, which had governed municipal and regional development. Not only was there less development owing to the economic downturn, but the philosophy behind regional planning ran contrary to the new philosophical goals of decentralization and downloading of authority. Consequently, one of the first major pieces of legislation enacted by the Klein government was the 1995 Municipal Government Act (MGA), which fundamentally altered the structure of planning power. This legislation empowered MDRV to act with new confidence in its development battles with the City of Calgary. The connection between global energy markets and rural/urban development battles is that not only do oil prices drive increasing demand for urban development when they are high, but they can also spark negative outcomes when low.
Regional Planning and Urban/Rural Conflict

Geographies of Power: Regional Planning and Urban Supremacy, 1959-1995
With a major oil discovery at Leduc in 1947, the Calgary and Alberta economies, already humming in the post-World War II consumption boom, accelerated further. In Calgary, quiescent administrative capacity in the oil patch-which originated with the inflow of Texan expertise when gas was discovered at nearby Turner Valley in 1913-sprang to life. Seemingly overnight, the somewhat sleepy agricultural hub Calgary had become after 35 years of slow growth quickly emerged as the administrative and financial nexus of the nation's oil industry and the corporate headquarters for most established and fledgling oil companies, both domestic and foreign (Stamp 2004) . Consequently, and not for the last time, the global oil economy had a direct influence on urban development pressure in Calgary, the Calgary metropolitan region, and in Alberta generally.
As a result, in the early 1950s, the province was confronted with serious issues revolving around runaway urban growth in an overheated, oil-fired economy. Instigated by development battles between the City of Edmonton and the nearby Municipal District of Strathcona (Climenhaga 1997, 33) , in 1954, the province convened the Royal Commission on the Metropolitan Development of Calgary and Edmonton (also known as the McNally Commission) to assess the situation regarding growth and development in Alberta's two major metropolitan regions and make recommendations to address the problems.
The commission was convened for three distinct purposes:
1. to recommend the boundaries and the form of local government that will most adequately and equitably provide for the orderly development of school and municipal services, 2. to recommend any practical measures that may be taken in the interests of the ratepayers and citizens generally with respect to the administration and financing of school and municipal matters and the form of government recommended to the areas under review, and 3. to hear representations from any and all interested bodies and to give consideration to any other factors relevant to the establishment of the boundaries, the form of local government, equitable distribution of costs, and the orderly development of areas.
The commission's recommendations were tabled in January 1956 (Alberta Royal Commissions and Commissions of Inquiry and McNally 1956
). The 17 recommendations on urban planning, the metropolitan areas, and the regions were underlain by a development philosophy predicated on four interrelated themes discussed below (Parker 2005) . From the application of these themes to the commission's objectives emerged a local interpretation for the concept of "uni-city," a philosophy designed to confront the realization that orderly development in a region could not proceed where dissent by one member municipality alone could disrupt an entire district plan (Climenhaga 1997, 34) . To achieve this goal, the system of voluntary District Planning Commissions, which had first been organized in 1950-1951, evolved through a series of amendments to the 1950 Town and Rural Planning Act (Burton 1981; Gordon and Hulchanski 1985; Climenhaga 1997) . Changes relevant to regional planning were imposed beginning in 1957 with the transfer of subdivision approval powers from the province to local authorities and culminated in 1963 with the Planning Act, which created Regional Planning Commissions (RPCs). These RPCs, unlike their voluntary predecessors, wielded the power of subdivision approval, allowing detailed control over development outcomes in the entire region (Laux 1990, 35) .
The recommendations of the McNally Commission Report (MCR), many of which were enacted into law in the amended 1957 planning legislation (Bettison et al. 1975) , had far-reaching consequences. Local outcomes depended on the local political geography and spatial outcomes of historical development decisions. To grow in Alberta, urban municipalities annex land from adjacent rural municipalities. Historically, this process has provoked ill will between urban and rural interests. The most intense conflict has been associated with the province's highest growth regions and is especially pronounced during times of rapidly accelerating economic activity (Climenhaga 1997) . Many small and midsized urban centers in zones of relatively slower growth (Leo and Anderson 2006) have had a more amicable record of cooperation.
To illustrate the intersection of the MCR and the RB case, we frame the spatial and political consequences of the situation with regard to the report's four main themes:
1. In one metropolitan economic and social unit, tax base equity is important, and the best form of governance within which to achieve this is through one central municipal authority. This theme reflects a local adaptation of uni-city philosophy (Collin, Leveillee, and Poitras 2002; Sancton 2002; Parker 2005) . Although unicity has sometimes been simplified to mean the percentage of the population of a region (or national space) living in the primate city (making it a measure of jurisdictional fragmentation), or as a parliamentary form of regional municipal governance (Leo and Piel 2006) , in the Alberta context, it refers to the philosophy that optimal organization is best achieved through the use of a regional plan, which is most efficiently aggregated at a regional scale with one, central power-wielding entity coordinating growth at multiple scales. With a centralized taxation authority, a more democratic form of regional taxation is achieved because residents of city and country are taxed according to the same criteria and level of delivered services. Reductions in the duplication of services are expected as jurisdictions are amalgamated.
From an urban/rural perspective in Alberta, uni-city philosophy endows a self-justified bias favoring the agenda of urban growth over that of rural interests. This bias was to become the heart of rural/urban conflict. More recently, uni-city, in the form of regional economic development, has been reconstituted from a neoliberal perspective typified by public/private partnerships, which bring together government and business in the combined goal of successfully competing in globalized markets (Sancton 2001) . 2. Where industrial development (meaning a business tax base) is occurring just outside an urban municipality, the tax base generated from this development should accrue to the same municipality that provides the educational and other municipal services to workers and families. This theme speaks to the harmonization of taxation and services and assumes that the employees of urban fringe industry lived in the city and commuted to work. Since workers and families spent most of their time in cities and made use of infrastructure provided at city expense, the city should be entitled to a share of rural industrial taxation. Uni-city was thought to provide the most efficient and fair means of equalizing the distribution of services and taxation, assuming that when the time was right, such industrial facilities would be subsumed through annexation into the urban fabric and the city's taxation regime. Under these conditions, a coherent logic of utility and infrastructure extension could be devised without the fear of interjurisdictional conflict or unanticipated development in undesirable locations. This measure further irritated rural landowners and politicians. Not only was local political authority diminished, but rural areas, already lacking in infrastructure, were denied the full benefit of local taxation income so their deficits were unlikely to improve. 3. Urban municipalities are entitled to growing space as they to expand into rural areas. Extended planning horizons necessitated spatially based political control over large tracts belonging to the rural municipality. With a moratorium on unapproved rural development within this zone, which surrounded the city equally on all sides, rural landowners felt denied the ability to benefit from their asset. Their economic well-being was being manipulated by a central authority whose first allegiance was seen to be to nonlocal interests. 4. Where areas adjacent to a city take on urban characteristics, these areas are best planned and governed by one municipality. Uni-city was seen as a solution to the problem of poor communities, such as Forest Lawn, and substandard development then appearing on the fringes of the large metropolitan areas in Alberta (Burton 1981) .
Following these themes, the new RPCs, legislated in the 1963 Planning Act (Laux 1990) , shaped the regional landscape for the next three decades. A high degree of order and efficiency was achieved, and the region was hailed as a world-class model of regional planning. But the commission's governance model, based on population, gave large, urban municipalities a virtual veto over the development agenda. In the decades following the 1963 act, many proposals for commercial development in MDRV were turned down by the province at the behest of objections from the Calgary RPC (Bettison et al. 1975) . Continued preference by the province for the urban agenda strengthened rural resistance to the goals of the commission and of regional planning, a legacy of resentment visible across the province in current development battles.
The 1995 Municipal Government Act: Reallocating Power and Rural Revenge
Before 1995, planning legislation was predicated on a particular vision of orderly development requiring state intervention in property markets and a centralized planning authority. Afterwards, as Elder (1996, 24) observes, "The twin strands of devolution of authority to municipalities and unleashing of market forces are evident in the[se] changes."
The changes most significant to this case were brought about in two policy areas: (1) supramunicipal planning, the rules governing how municipal neighbors behave in resolving disputes, and (2) increased decentralization, the transfer of subdivision approval authority from the province to every municipality, whether urban or rural (Elder 1996) . Compulsory regional planning and mandatory regional plans were abolished. A secondary function of the RPCs had been as a "watchdog" to ensure development in member municipalities conformed with the regional plan, leading to occasions that contravened local autonomy (Laux 1990, 110-11) . Under the new MGA, however, local development was no longer subjected to the scrutiny of other governments beyond a common intermunicipal development zone-an area 5 km in width inside the rural jurisidiction along the common border of the municipalities. This new freedom to develop emboldened MDRV to issue a development permit to RB without a secure utility servicing agreement and that sought solutions that would never have been entertained under regional planning, for example, the construction of a redundant, unintegrated water infrastructure system. Under the 1995 legislation, final authority over development was transferred from the province to the municipalities. No longer did adjacent jurisdictions have the ability to appeal development decisions outside the intermunicipal development zone because of the new provincial credo of downloading development responsibility to local municipalities. Previously, under the auspices of the regional planning commissions, cities could, and on many occasions did, derail rural development initiatives by appealing to the Alberta Planning Board. Now there was no provincial planning authority over development in municipalities and, hence, no authority to which decisions could be appealed.
With these changes, we can see how the philosophy of uni-city embraced in the MCR was undermined particularly in relation to the development themes. Another significant consequence was a large transfer of tax revenue from the city to MDRV. The situation where taxes generated by industrial development on the city fringe were directed to the city was reversed. Instead, taxation resulting from intense rural gentrification along with commercial and industrial development was directed to MDRV, although the urban services consumed by these urban refugees were still mainly supplied by Calgary. This situation enabled MDRV, unencumbered by the need to provide expensive urban services already available in the city, to undercut the city's tax rates to encourage development.
Unintended Consequences
Since the establishment of regional planning in Alberta in the early 1960s, annexation proceedings have generally been highly contested, generating strong feelings of resentment among rural landowners and politicians. Calgary's last major land grab had occurred in 1989, closing a record-breaking decade of annexation, but relatively little development activity occurred during the 1990s as oil prices remained low. It is important because for the Calgary metropolitan region, the round of annexation proceedings in 2004 were the first negotiations of significance in which rural politicians were able to fully exercise the new bundle of development powers endowed in the 1995 MGA. The legislation's underpinning, a neoliberal agenda characterized by values of individualism, small government, and fiscal austerity, combined with a complementary devolution of power to control development outcomes (Elder 1996) , enabled MDRV to prevail over its larger and stronger opponent to control development in its territory. Noting that such outcomes could never have occurred under the uni-city planning paradigm embodied in McNally report and the pre-1995 regime, Calgary politicians renewed their appeal to the province for a return to regional planning, a stance vociferously rejected in MDRV (Hope 2004; Myers 2005) .
In mid-October 2005, a new circumstance emerged that threatened to disrupt Rocky View's aggressive development plan, when the province released a draft for a new water management plan for the South Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB) that recommended a permanent moratorium for new waters licenses on three of the four rivers constituting the basin, including the Bow River, on which both Calgary and MDRV depend for water. The moratorium, subsequently formalized in 2006, was the culmination of a process first instigated in 2001 in response to "a demonstrated need for protection" as "a growing population and economy are putting unprecedented pressure on water resources" (Alberta Environment 2005). Suddenly, for MDRV, the issue was not only how water was to be delivered but also from where it would come. This unforeseen event left MDRV in dire straits, as not only was service to RB in peril, but a nearby $1.5 billion commercial megaproject (consisting of a horse-racing track, hotel, casino, retail mall, and an agricultural college extension), already under construction, was also threatened (Figure 1 ). In these new circumstances, then, the original plan to twin the sewer line skirting Calgary's east flank with an intake on the Bow River, downstream of Calgary, was not possible. Thus the announcement of the moratorium further convinced Calgary politicians that in order to proceed, both with the packing plant and megaproject, MDRV would have to accede in the concurrent annexation negotiations, which at that moment were at an impasse. But MDRV had different ideas. The first was a scheme to divert water from the Red Deer River (100 km away), the only major river in the SSRB not affected by the moratorium. But this initiative, repackaged a number of times, met with stiff political opposition, especially from the river's current users, and was finally rejected. At this point, construction at the megaproject site, whose permits had been issued at a time when water seemed freely available, was scaled back pending resolution of the search for water. Finally, in the spring of 2007, after what one MDRV politician said were "many sleepless nights," a solution was found. The Western Irrigation District (WID; one of 13 districts in a quasigovernmental network managing the distribution of water for irrigation in southern Alberta) agreed to sell a portion of its abundant licence to MDRV in return for a $15 million upgrade to its canal system. As the WID draws its water from the Bow River at Calgary, the twinning of the wastewater pipeline with a freshwater line could proceed as originally planned. The (lack of) availability of water for development, however, has been permanently embedded as a factor for all future development in the region.
Ironically, after all the conflict associated with the development of the packing plant, and the considerable unintended consequences that we have linked to it, RB survived for a very short period of time. In August 2007, the plant closed and filed for creditor protection. Its closure was affected by the reopening of the U.S. border to live animals younger than 30 months, which has resulted in a reduction of slaughter capacity utilization in Canada to 70%. Another factor, however, was that the plant had invested $10 million in a sophisticated tracing system that allowed individual animals to be traced from the plant to the store. This was intended to allow the testing of individual animals for BSE, which would have increased the marketability of their beef at a premium price, particularly in Japan. However, Canadian Food Inspection Agency policy has rejected testing of healthy animals, with the result that "government policy has rendered the investment in the tracing system to be presently of little or no value," according to the president, Tony Martinez (MacArthur 2007, 11) . It is widely believed among cattle producers that these restrictions on testing are the result of American reluctance to increase testing and pressures for harmonization of food safety regulation between the two countries.
Conclusion: Regarding Implausible Outcomes
In conclusion, we return to the question of implausible outcomes. David (1985) , to recall, identified three features of evolutionary systems that conspire to produce "path dependence": first, that small, historically contingent "accidents" can have profound long-term effects on the system's future pathways; second, that early decisions reverberate through history, closing alternative paths and validating others; and third, that technological "lockin" creates a situation that, when speaking of urban systems, encourages particular patterns of reinvestment in the urban form.
Each of the key elements we have presented in this article is rife with examples of these path-making processes. For example, the random placement of a cartographic grid encouraged the CPR to build its passenger station in Section 15 rather than in the more developed Section 14. This, in turn, prompted a cascade of spatial consequences that did not manifest on a frictionless plain but rather were constrained and enabled by the geologic heritage of the landscape: ice, water, and wind. From this intersection of geography and economic decision making arose a chain of spatial outcomes that configured both the spatial and social reality of the modern city, whose boundaries, in turn, marked the arena within which the RB case would unfold.
Another of these seeming accidents was the arrival of BSE in 2003. Over more than a century, the economics of the beef industry in Alberta had evolved into a system with one primary purpose, the production of live cattle for shipment to American feedlots, where they would be fattened and sold for slaughter (Foran 2002) . As such, the focus of the industry in Alberta was to provide the most efficient and profitable configuration of organizational productivity to achieve this goal. When export markets disappeared overnight, however, the system collapsed and local slaughter capacity was overwhelmed. And timing is everything (Pierson 2000b) . The random appearance of BSE, just at a moment in time when battles over rural land development were at their most fever pitched, made it possible for MDRV to leverage the province's response to the crisis to underwrite some of its ambitious development plans. Not inconsequentially, none of these options or responses would have been possible under the regime of regional planning and development that had only recently been reformed.
A third example of "historical accident" is the emergence of water scarcity as an issue of imminent concern. Recent legislation, prompted by the stark realization that the old law envisioned water as an inexhaustible resource when, in fact, it was anything but (Percy 1996) , led to a moratorium on new allocations. Furthermore, in low-flow years, which with global warming are predicted to increase, junior licensees may not receive their full allocation. The recent meteoric growth of cities and the fact that 87% of water allocations from the Bow River basins are currently directed for irrigation and less than 13% for municipal purposes (Alberta Environment: Regional Services Southern Region 2003) are potential sources of future conflict.
Similarly, there are a number of standout examples of how early events and choices in the city have reverberated through its evolution. Our main example is to observe how the sociospatial relations of uneven development in east Calgary caused the location of RB's labor hinterland and, hence, their choice of plant location to be spatially proximate. We have argued that this outcome is not by chance; indeed, lower land prices, due in part to noxious emissions from the beef industry, narrowed the range of settlement destinations for the immigrant class composing RB's primary labor force.
A second example is the back story of how Calgary came to be the corporate heart of the Canadian oil industry in the first place, an outcome not readily explainable by simply considering Edmonton's closer proximity to Leduc, site of the first major oil find in Alberta. Why did this administrative function not flow to Edmonton, which was more logically situated to capture this lucrative portion of the industry? The answer lies primarily in the dormant capacity for oil administration that had existed in Calgary owing to the discovery of natural gas at nearby Turner Valley in 1913. That event encouraged a migration of American oilmen from Houston who brought with them expertise garnered in the mature Texas oil industry. By the time Imperial Oil's Leduc Number One-the well that started it all-struck oil in 1947, the industry in Calgary was experiencing low levels of development activity, as its gas fields had by then matured. But the capacity that had first arrived from Texas in 1913 sprang quickly back to life with a new boom in exploration and drilling following Leduc.
Today Calgary is home to the Canadian headquarters of every national and international oil corporation with an interest in Alberta's oil resources. During its August 2005 move from Toronto, Imperial Oil, the last major to move to Calgary, relocated some 3,000 employees; yet these were only a small fraction of an avalanche of immigrants who have descended on the Calgary region at a rate of 2,200 per month for since 2001 (Table 1) . In this example, it is easy to see how development pressures-the need for housing, infrastructure, schools, utilities, and so on-are in turn influenced by increased oil industry activity. Moreover, as enough of these new migrants are well enough paid to afford a "rurban" lifestyle, which is centered, not surprisingly, on Calgary's west side (which boasts little industrial development and spectacular mountain vistas), the more these development pressures spill over into the surrounding region. The culmination of the battle over future urban spaces, as we have discussed, is now being played out through development and annexation battles between municipal jurisdictions.
While David (1985) specified technical lock-in, the engineering/economic side of path dependence, for the purpose of extending the metaphor to this case study, we view lock-in in terms of the social, institutional, and political forces that embed themselves in the fabric of the urban spatial matrix as it evolves over time. This process not only provides a continuous source of positive feedback, which perpetuates social inequality through the built environment, but it also shapes and assesses social and environmental outcomes through the lens of growth and development. An example from this case study is how the diminished status of east Calgary, once imprinted, became locked in through subsequent economic, social, and political actions. So from this evolutionary perspective, each new investment in the built environment contributed an additional degree of lock-in, further constraining the future trajectory of the system. Similarly, the organization of the beef industry was locked in to a system that had been optimized for a single purpose and, when confronted with unpredicted events that radically altered the rules of the game, was unprepared to cope.
The goal of this article has been to present a narrative model of Calgary's historical development to illustrate how pathways of decision making are intertwined with chance circumstances and systemic processes to produce outcomes with spatial consequences that both constrain and enable particular urban futures. Once embraced, these processes are selfreinforcing; that is, they respond to positive feedback with growth. For example, once east Calgary became the site of industrial development, a consequence flowing from decisions made soon after the first European settlement in Calgary, all future residential development east of the industrial zone was destined to be of considerably lower economic status and reduced environmental quality. This spatial outcome, replicated until today, provoked certain citizens in 2004 to protest yet another unfavorable economic and environmental outcome looming in their future.
From a spatial perspective, the initial distribution of amenities and hazards in the built environment played a pivotal role in determining the tenor and location of future conflict. And as greater power to control development was relinquished to market forces through a new philosophy of governance, spatial outcomes resulting from the goal of profit maximization have not necessarily coincided with the public's best interest. This disconnection can be ascribed to generations of positive economic feedback that have, through their historic interactions, constituted the present-day state of sociospatial relations.
From a temporal perspective, we note that various spatial processes evolve through differing cycles of temporal dynamics each with a unique time-space relation. This cross-scale structure (Allen and Holling 2002) has profound implications for urban development in that potential spatial outcomes are unduly influenced by a few key decisions made early in the process (Pierson 2000a) , limiting, in turn, how potential futures may unfold (Plummer and Sheppard 2006) . Thus, as we have seen, the intersection of long-term historic and short-term contemporary forces of urban development have construed to produce unpredictable, yet bounded, outcomes. In this case, initial locational choices for Calgary's economic and industrial infrastructure resulted in a contemporary spatial reality that both spurred industrial investors to prefer a northeast Calgary location and prompted, at various historic moments, the social indignation of nearby area residents.
On the surface, the decision to build expensive, new infrastructure appears to be a routine sort of development strategy taken daily by rural and urban municipalities everywhere as they compete for lucrative industrial development. But below the surface, more complex, historic processes are ever at work. In this case, local geologic history gave material form to the city, which in turn embedded a spatial logic that, once set, became increasingly difficult to alter. In these sorts of evolutionary systems, the agency to affect change diminishes over time as urban policy and capitalist investment, guided by decades of history and precedent, locks in a particular socially spatialized configuration of capital relations.
